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Abstract
Direct exporting activities and outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) are two 
types of internationalization that differ in firms’ opportunities, resources and risks. 
We study home-country institutional factors for internationalization and empirically 
investigate the direct and joint effects of export regulations, credit markets and 
corruption in explaining exporting and OFDI from a country. Using country-level 
data from 96 developed and developing countries between 2000 and 2018, we 
test a series of hypotheses and examine nonlinearity in the relationships. The results 
of the study suggest that export regulations partially affect exporting but do not 
affect OFDI. Access to financial resources can be critical in parts for both exports 
and OFDI. The findings also show that corruption can have different implications 
for exports and OFDI. The interactions of corruption with export regulations and 
credit markets reveal some unexpected and counter-intuitive results, highlighting 
the importance of distinguishing between the direct and indirect (joint) effects of 
business environment factors and corruption on exports and OFDI. The results of 
the study contain important information for policymakers.
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1. Introduction
Many countries have undertaken significant policy interventions in the form of 
regulatory reforms intending to promote internationalization (Stoian and Mohr, 
2016; Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2019) for domestic firms to achieve growth in 
foreign markets. Exports and outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) are two 
types of internationalization activities that differ in motivation and process, required 
resources, cost structure and associated risk (Benacek et al., 2000; Asamoah 
et al., 2019).
Exporting provides access to new markets, and OFDI can broadly support economic 
development and macroeconomic gains in some contexts (see Knoerich, 2017). 
Yet, firms seeking new markets when they internationalize can seek access to 
these markets in different ways. Many business decisions and activities, including 
internationalization, may be chosen on the basis of the institutional environment 
(see Williamson, 2000; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015). OFDI widens the options 
for firms to respond to the home-country environment, in addition to exporting. 
For instance, OFDI can help a firm escape challenges in the home country 
(see Cuervo-Cazzura et al., 2017, 2015; Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2017; 
Shi et al., 2017; Witt and Lewin, 2007), whereas exports may not provide that 
option. Yet, exporting may entail fewer foreign market risks (Gaur et al., 2014) or 
a different kind of known risk, and a firm can use the home-country environment 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015) to its advantage (see McDougall and Oviatt, 2000; 
Lu and Beamish, 2001).
The institutional environment for internationalization includes not only institutions 
that directly govern exporting (export regulations) but also the institutions that 
provide necessary capital inputs to firms to be able to internationalize (credit markets) 
(see Armour and Cumming, 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Thus, policymakers 
play an essential role in setting the conditions under which firms internationalize. 
In addition, the process of getting it all done, such as the extent to which corruption 
is embedded in the environment, is an essential consideration for firm decisions in 
many contexts (Chowdhury et al., 2019; Altomonte, 2000).
Previous research shows that the interplay between formal institutions such as 
regulations and informal institutions such as corruption are important in understanding 
both firm outcomes (Audretsch et al., 2021; Chowdhury et al., 2019) and whether, 
for example, corruption is “sand” or “grease” for the process of internationalizing 
(Méon and Weill, 2010; Méon and Sekat, 2005). Therefore, policymakers need to 
consider internationalization processes in the context of corruption. 
To understand how these interact, we investigate the relationship between 
these two types of internationalization (exports and OFDI) with an institutional 
context, specifically home-country export regulations, domestic credit markets 
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and corruption. We draw on institutional frameworks to derive and test a set 
of hypotheses about exports and OFDI, and we use data from 96 countries 
from 2000 to 2018 to test a set of hypotheses about the direct and indirect 
effects of institutional context. We provide insight into how home-country 
institutional conditions can shape internationalization (Bernard et al., 2007; Luiz 
et al., 2017; Krammer et al., 2018), which is relatively less studied than the host 
country context.
In doing so, our study advances knowledge in two substreams of research. 
First, we contribute insights into the effect of export regulations and credit markets 
during internationalization (Vujanović et al., 2021; Audretsch et al., 2019; Luiz et 
al. 2017) by demonstrating that exports and OFDI activity respond to changing 
tariff and non-tariff regulation, market disclosure and non-financial investment. 
Second, we advance knowledge on home-country factors in the extensive 
literature on the dynamics of different types of internationalization (Luiz et al., 2017). 
Finally, we extend international business and management research by distinguishing 
between the direct and indirect (joint) effects of business environment factors and 
corruption on exports and OFDI (see Lu and Beamish, 2001; Bernard et al. 2007; 
Krammer et al. 2018). 
Our analysis is relevant for public policy. We find that corruption can play a mixed 
role in exports and OFDI and that greater regulation of exports limits exports and 
OFDI. We find lower tariff rates to be associated with exports. Finally, our results 
show that improving access to credit and easing export requirements can be 
relevant considerations for internationalization in some contexts. 
Next, we present and hypothesize about links among export regulations, credit 
markets, corruption and internationalization. In the third section, we describe our 
data and methodology. The fourth section presents our results, followed in the next 
section by the robustness check. Section six reports conclusions, policy implications 
and recommendations, and section seven offers future research directions.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Institutional context and internationalization
Institutions reflect the “rules of the game” that shape economic activity (North, 
1990). Broadly, formal institutions represent codified conditions, and informal 
institutions reflect norms and uncodified “systems of meaning” (Deephouse et 
al., 2016). Whereas formal rules themselves may be explicit and well-articulated, 
informal institutions tend to “have never been consciously designed” (Sugden, 
1986, p. 54).
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The institutional environment in a country shapes conducive or challenging 
conditions for business activities (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; North, 1990; 
Witt and Lewin, 2007) and is an important influence on business decisions of firms, 
which can respond in different ways such as whether and how to internationalize 
(see Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019; Oliver, 1991). In addition, interactions between 
formal institutions and informal institutions (i.e. corruption) are important, as 
monitoring and enforcement of rules can vary across countries (see Acemoglu et 
al., 2001; Miller, 2000). In some environments, informal institutions can be as or 
even more important than formal institutions (see Baumol, 1990). 
Regulatory institutions directly shape business activities. For example, an exporting 
firm needs to clear export regulations in the home country and meet requirements 
in another country. However, any number of dimensions and regulatory focus area 
permutations means that the effects of regulation on a firm are not always clear or 
linear (Audretsch et al., 2019). For example, the financial cost (e.g. filing fees) to file a 
required document may be low, but the time it takes to complete the document may 
be lengthy. Or, the same type of documentation required to register property in one 
country may be easy to accomplish, but it may be difficult in another country with a 
different system. In addition, some regulatory arrangements may raise transaction 
costs, whereas others may protect consumers and firms, facilitate transactions and 
reduce uncertainty (see Beltiski et al., 2016; Chowdhury et al., 2019). 
2.2 Home-country export regulation and internationalization
Firms need to navigate clusters of action (see Krammer et al., 2018), including 
obtaining the requisite permissions, licences and legal requirements to engage in 
the internationalization process. Both exporting and OFDI require compliance with 
home-country regulations in the internationalization process, such as to finance 
domestic production expansion or capabilities or to move capital or goods across 
borders. Firms interested in internationalizing incur fixed costs that are sunk costs 
(Impullitti et al., 2013) – known, upfront costs necessary to comply with regulations 
(Chetty and Hamilton, 1993; Bernard et al., 2007).
Under conditions where export regulations are easy to navigate and firms incur 
relatively fewer costs to meet regulatory requirements, exporting may be an 
attractive activity. When the stated requirements are clear and reflect the process 
in practice, firms can rely on such information and commit to exporting what they 
produce in their home country. They can anticipate the costs of internationalization 
accordingly. In contrast, when firms become misaligned with the regulatory 
environment (see Witt and Lewin, 2007), they may experience a competitive 
disadvantage and may reposition themselves (Yamakawa et al., 2013; Witt and 
Lewin, 2007) by acquiescing, complying or adapting, appealing or compromising, 
defying, manipulating, or escaping or avoiding the regulatory environment 
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(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2019; Oliver, 1991). Furthermore, OFDI activities can widen 
the options for firms to respond to a challenging home-country environment by 
establishing a subsidiary in another country. We therefore hypothesize as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: More extensive home-country export regulations will 
(a) discourage internationalization through exports and (b) encourage 
internationalization through OFDI.
2.3 Home-country credit markets and internationalization
Access to capital varies across countries, reflecting differences in the development 
and strength of credit markets. Differences in credit market development can help 
explain differences in export patterns (Manova, 2008). Both exports and OFDI 
require financial capital for several reasons. Export regulations can be accompanied 
by direct financial costs in the form of permits and fees. In addition to these direct 
costs, there can also be indirect costs, such as staff time spent in complying with 
regulations, which could be redirected away from conducting firm growth-oriented 
activities or paying for legal or accounting expertise. 
Firms could also incur costs related to search (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012) and 
exploration in foreign markets to determine if they should export or invest and to 
assess potential profitability in the foreign market (Bernard et al., 2007). In addition, 
firms that expand in foreign markets can face a wide range of costs, such as those 
related to transportation (e.g., freight and time costs), policy (e.g., tariffs and non-
tariff matters), information, contracts, currency, legal and regulatory needs, and 
local distribution costs (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004: 692). Thus, financing is an 
important consideration for firms looking to internationalize. 
Creditor rights can play a prominent role in economies with functional bankruptcy 
systems (Djankov et al., 2007; Chetty and Hamilton, 1993). Previous research has 
found that loans have more concentrated ownership in countries with stronger 
creditor protection, longer maturities and lower interest rates (see Qian and Strahan, 
2007). Investor protections affect how firms raise the capital needed to start 
and grow, innovate, diversify and compete. Without investor protections, equity 
markets are stunted and banks become the only source of finance. Economies with 
deep, dynamic capital markets tend to protect investors effectively, as they receive 
the information they can trust more. In the absence of such protections, they 
may be reluctant to invest in their home country unless they become controlling 
shareholders, reducing the supply of equity capital in-house (Dahya et al., 2008). 
A weak financial system in the home country may result in firms moving away 
from internationalization activities because they are not able to finance them. 
Or, it could result in firms shifting their attention to seek financial resources abroad 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015), which could raise costs (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) 
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related to searching abroad and dealing with potential intermediaries. This kind of 
redirection – which could occur through OFDI activity – would not be necessary if 
firms could find resources in the home country. We therefore posit as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Less developed home-country credit markets will (a) 
discourage internationalization through exports and (b) encourage 
internationalization through OFDI.
2.4 Home-country corruption and internationalization
Another important consideration for firms is corruption, which can become an 
expected condition for firms when it is deeply entrenched in a country (see Audretsch 
et al., 2019; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Li et al., 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 2007). 
For firms seeking to internationalize, “rules of procedures that actors employ flexibly 
and reflexively to assure themselves and those around them that their behavior 
is reasonable” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991, p. 20) can pose a threat because of 
the nature and costs of corruption.
Corruption is primarily associated with adverse effects on economic activity 
(Audretsch et al., 2019; Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), 
although there is a debate that it may “grease the wheels” for businesses in some 
situations (see Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Belitski et al. 
(2016) argue that corruption is harmful in the long term because access to resources 
is built through hidden and informal channels, which become institutionalized over 
time, and this increases the vulnerability of firms and redirects the pool of public 
resources away from other investments.
When corruption is deeply embedded, it can result in changing behaviour such 
that it becomes common in business practices (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Firms 
that need export permits or tax documents to enter foreign markets may be easy 
targets for public officials during regulatory compliance processes. These firms 
will have to seek out interactions specific to internationalization that non-exporting 
firms would not. Where corrupt officials can hinder or delay approvals so as to 
create an opportunity for bribes (Myrdal, 1986), this increases firms’ vulnerability. 
Firms engaged in export activities may be able to grow by accessing a larger 
market, but at the same time, this could put them on the radar of corrupt officials. 
Some firms may have the resources to afford to pay bribes (Tonoyan et al., 2010), 
access corrupt officials to facilitate their transactions, and seek to build channels 
or maintain their access. However, these payments or relationship costs still divert 
resources from productive activities, such as investing in export capability.
When corruption is associated with relative loss of home institutional legitimacy 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and firms do not trust the environment in the home 
country, they may prefer to move their capital abroad in OFDI activity rather than 
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attempting to export. Thus, OFDI could reduce their vulnerability to corruption 
associated with production and exporting from the home country. We, therefore, 
hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Home-country corruption will (a) discourage 
internationalization through exports and (b) encourage 
internationalization through OFDI.
2.5  The moderating effect of corruption and regulations  
on internationalization
When complying with export regulations, a firm might be asked to pay bribes if 
officials use their power to delay or interfere with the paperwork necessary for 
export permits to seek bribes. This cuts into potential profits and exposes the firm 
to possible future corruption without recourse (see Belitski et al., 2016; Audretsch 
et al., 2019). Enforcement of regulations also influences how firms comply with 
regulations. In an environment with poor or arbitrary enforcement in line with the 
codified guidance and with high corruption, the rules may be applied to some firms 
unevenly or differently (Meon and Weill, 2010; Laeven and Woodruff, 2007). 
Firms may be uncomfortable or unable to find institutional alignment (Witt and 
Lewin, 2007) in a difficult or discretionary regulatory environment. Depending on 
their available resources, they may explore the options available to them and decide 
on bargaining versus not bargaining with authorities. Bargaining behaviour is likely 
to occur before avoidance of bargaining, should the export regulations be flexible 
and potential bribe costs affordable (see Djankov 2002, Méon and Sekkat, 2005; 
Meon and Weill, 2010). Non-bargaining behaviour may result in non-compliance and 
avoidance, including looking for ways to reduce visibility to corruption, incentivizing 
a firm to stay small and not engage in exports or in seeking growth outside the 
country through OFDI. 
Greater corruption combined with extensive export regulations mean more points 
of interaction where firms could be exploited, encouraging avoidance (Luiz et al., 
2017). Furthermore, Djankov (2002) found that more corruption is associated with a 
highly regulated environment. This kind of environment, marked by high corruption 
and extensive export regulation, could motivate firms that are interested in exporting 
to abandon the effort or to look for other internationalization opportunities. 
Therefore, we posit as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Higher home-country corruption will (a) accentuate 
the negative relationship between export regulations and exports and 
(b) accentuate the positive relationship between export regulations 
and OFDI.
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2.6  The moderating effect of corruption and credit markets  
on internationalization
Corruption can affect credit markets and how firms can access them. It distorts 
the efficient flow of capital resources to productive projects (Khwaja and Mian, 
2011). In a corrupt context, lenders may instead redirect financial resources to 
unproductive projects rather than finding and funding the most competitive and 
promising projects. Institutional lenders may already view internationalization into 
new foreign markets as risky or expensive, so diversion of capital can worsen access 
for potential exporters. Without access to capital, firms are unlikely to invest fully 
in exporting and, in a highly corrupt context, are also more likely to divert existing 
funds to pay bribes in other areas. O’Toole and Tarp (2014) test how informal bribe 
payments affect the marginal return per unit of investment and find that bribery can 
decrease investment efficiency. 
More corruption is likely to accelerate the difficulties that firms face in a weak credit 
market and create a double constraint, particularly for firms that do not have the 
means to self-finance or that are new, small or first-time exporters. These constraints 
could discourage exports and motivate OFDI to more efficient foreign credit markets 
with less or no corruption (see Witt and Lewin, 2007; Stoian and Mohr, 2016; Cuervo-
Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2017). We thus hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 5: Higher home-country corruption will (a) accentuate the 
negative effect of weak credit markets on exports and (b) accentuate 
the positive effect of weak credit markets on OFDI.
Figure 1 shows the hypothesized relationships. 
Figure 1. Conceptual model and hypotheses
Home Country Export 
Regulations (H1a (-), b(+))
Home Country Access 
to Credit (H2a (-), b (+))
Exports
(H4a (-), b (+)) (H5a (-), b (+))
Home Country Corruption 
(H3a(-), b (+))
Source: Based on authors' estimations.
OFDI
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3. Data and method
3.1 Data and sample
We construct the sample for our analysis by matching data from multiple sources 
for the period 2000–2018: ILOSTAT, World Bank and OECD (national accounts), 
Transparency International, the World Bank’s Doing Business data, its World 
Development Indicators, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government 
Finance Statistics, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
and the UNSTAT Sustainable Development Goal Indicators. Our sample includes 
96 developed and developing countries, offering good coverage of institutional 
contexts (see Audretsch et al., 2019; Thai and Turkina, 2013). 
Our data set is an unbalanced panel covering the 96 countries over the period 
2000-2018. Our final sample consists of 1,433 observations of the variables of 
interest, where data are available. 
3.2 Dependent variables
We use two country-level measures for internationalization. Institutional factors have 
differential effects across industries and types of firms; however, to gain insight 
into the overall picture for the whole economy, we use country-level measures 
for internationalization. All variables used in the models and their definitions and 
measurement are presented in table 1. First, exports are measured as a share of GDP, 
taken from World Bank national accounts data (World Bank, 2019), reflecting direct 
exporting activity undertaken by businesses (see Krammer et al., 2018). The values 
in our sample vary from 8.24 to 188 per cent of GDP (where exports significantly 
overtake GDP, such as in economies that are involved in substantial international trade 
activity with a little value added to each service or good); the average is 40.68 per cent. 
OFDI is measured as net FDI outflow as a share of GDP (Witt and Lewin, 2007), 
taken from IMF balance-of-payments data (2019). The extent of outward direct 
investment can be seen as an indication of a mature economy. OFDI has been 
linked to investment competitiveness and is crucial for long-term, sustained growth 
(see Asamoah et al., 2019). For example, firms from the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Japan and the United States have long made extensive investments outside their 
domestic markets and have high positive OFDI. Other economies receive large 
amounts of OFDI, as China has for the past two decades, for example, and have 
negative OFDI. The average OFDI is 1.52, which demonstrates that, on average, 
countries invest more abroad than they receive (as a per cent of GDP). A negative 
OFDI value of 89.63 illustrates that the country had net inward FDI equal to 
89.63 per cent of GDP (table 2). 
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3.3 Explanatory variables
We use three measures for home-country export regulations. First, we use the 
time to export (border compliance), the number of hours needed to comply with 
procedures to export goods and services. It is taken from the World Bank Doing 
Business data (see Li, 2019). Second, we use customs procedures, which measures 
business executives’ perceptions about the efficiency of customs procedures in their 
country, with ratings ranging from -1 to -7. This is taken from the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (WEF, 2019). We reverse this indicator in 
our analysis so that a value of -7 reflects extremely efficient custom procedures and 
a value of -1 reflects extremely inefficient procedures. Our third measure for home-
country export regulations is tariff regulation, calculated as the average of effective 
applied rates, weighted by product import shares, corresponding to each partner 
country; this is taken from the UNSTAT Sustainable Development Goal Indicators.1
We use three measures to capture the scope, accessibility and effectiveness of 
domestic credit markets in the home country, taken from the IMF and Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook. The disclosure index measures the extent to which 
investors are protected through the disclosure of ownership and financial information. 
Domestic credit to the private sector, expressed as a percentage of GDP, reflects 
financial institutions’ financial resources (e.g. loans, purchases of non-equity securities, 
trade credits and other accounts receivable). The third measure accounts for the 
breadth of non-financial investment as a percentage of GDP, such as investment in 
government fixed assets, inventories, valuables and non-production assets. 
To measure corruption (perceived corruption), we use the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) from Transparency International. Corruption is estimated as an aggregate 
indicator at the country level, in units of a standard normal distribution which was 
normalized and reversed, i.e., ranging from approximately -1 (highly corrupt) to 
-100 (very clean) (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Audretsch et al., 2019). In our study, the 
range is a value of -15 (Botswana) to -99 (Norway).
3.4 Control variables
We also include several control variables that may influence export activities and 
OFDI, drawing on previous research. Detailed definitions of the control variables 
and their measurement and sources are listed in table 1. Economic development is 
measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity in constant 2010 United 
States dollars, in logarithms. We control for the size of home-country demand by 
using population (see Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008, 2012). We proxy for government size 
1 https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3915152
41
Home-country export regulations, credit markets, and corruption:  
implications for different types of internationalization
using government expenditures (see Audretsch et al., 2021), including consumption 
and transfers as a percentage of GDP. Given the importance of industry in market 
opportunities, we also control for the industry in the domestic home economy.
We also use several variables to proxy for the broader business environment in a 
country, as prior research shows the importance of business regulations in shaping 
managerial decision-making, firm activities and performance (see Welter et al., 2019). 
In line with research on the importance of considering multiple dimensions of business 
regulation, as well as how regulations are implemented through administrative 
processes or financial costs (Audretsch et al., 2019), our controls include measures 
for the time, cost or procedures related to specific business regulation focus areas. 
We include two measures of entry regulation because it affects the pool of new 
firms (Klapper et al., 2006) from which future exporters emerge and can affect firm 
profitability (Cherchye and Verriest, 2016). Changing technologies have affected 
the speed of scaling and internationalization, with many start-ups now being “born 
global” firms (Cavusgil and Knight, 2015; Sinkovics and Penz, 2005). Time to 
entry captures the number of days needed to comply with entry regulation, and 
entry procedures reflects the number of separate procedures to start and formally 
operate a business in the country. 
We include two measures related to property registration, as security of property 
is an important factor in the emergence and nature of the business activity 
(see Johnson et al., 2002), and the cost and uncertainty of securing property 
can influence not only whether people start firms, but also which activities they 
undertake. For example, firms may consider the complexity of property registration 
if they are considering opening a production facility to produce goods for export. 
We use the time to register property, measured as the number of days needed to 
register property, and procedures to register property, captured as the number of 
procedures to register a property. These measures are based on a standard case 
of an entrepreneur who wants to buy land and an already registered building that is 
free of title dispute.2 All of the entry regulations and property registration data come 
from the Doing Business data. 
Our controls for the regulatory environment also include measures of tax policy, 
which affects the ability of firms to make and anticipate profits, shaping strategic 
decisions about business activities and business growth (see Belitski et al., 2016). 
We include the profit tax rate (World Bank, 2019). Given the heterogeneous nature 
of the effects of various forms of tax policy (Audretsch et al., 2021; Chowdhury et 
al., 2015), we also include the time required to pay taxes in hours per year, including 
preparation and filing time (from the Doing Business data). 
2 See doingbusiness.org for detailed description of the underlying data sources.
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We also capture potentially relevant labour market trends by including unemployment 
in a country (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000) as well as the quality of scientific research, 
measured using the number of scientific and engineering articles published 
(in physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, 
engineering and technology, and earth sciences) (Schultz, 1959; Mincer, 1974). 
We do this because scientific activity is important for economic and innovation 
activity in a country (Sepehrdoust et al., 2021, 2020; Olavarrieta and Villena, 2014). 
Investors could have opportunities to profit from the commercialization of science 
in the home country, but at the same time, new and better products and services 
that result from scientific discoveries and innovation can be attractive in foreign 
markets and mean more export opportunities. 
Table 1 describes the variables in our study, and table 2 presents the descriptive 
statistics and the correlation matrix. The majority of our variables are not highly 
correlated.
Table 1.  Variable definition and measurement   
Variable Description Source
Exports Exports of goods and services (per cent of GDP) World Bank, national 
accounts data, and 
OECD, National  
Accounts data
OFDI Net FDI outflows of investment from the reporting economy to the 




Time to export Time to export, border compliance (in hours) in logs.
Captures the time associated with compliance with the economy’s 
customs regulations and with regulations relating to other 
inspections that are mandatory in order for the shipment to cross 
the economy’s border, as well as the time for handling that takes 
place at its port or border. 




Burden of customs procedure (reversed) 
Measures business executives’ perceptions of their country’s 
efficiency of customs procedures with ratings ranging from 
-1 to -7, whereby -7 denotes extremely efficient and – 1 denotes 
extremely inefficient
World Economic Forum, 
Executive Opinion 
Survey and Global 
Competitiveness Report 
Trade tariff Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, all products (%)
Weighted mean applied tariff: average of effectively applied rates 
weighted by the product import shares corresponding to each 
partner country
UNSTAT, Global SDG 
Indicators Database
Disclosure index Business extent of disclosure index  
(0 = less disclosure to 10 = more disclosure)
Measures the extent to which investors are protected through 
disclosure of ownership and financial information
World Bank, Doing 
Business Project
Corruption  Corruption Perception Index, normalized and reversed 
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Net investment in government non-financial assets (per cent 
of GDP)








Domestic credit to private sector (per cent of GDP)
Refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by 
financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of non-
equity securities and trade credits and other accounts receivable, 
that establish a claim for repayment; for some countries these 
claims include credit to public enterprises
International Monetary 
Fund, International 




GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (constant 2010 US$) World Bank, national 
accounts data
Population Country population, in logarithms World Bank, national 
accounts data
Government size General government final consumption expenditure (per cent of 
GDP) (formerly general government consumption). 
World Bank, national 
accounts data
Industry Manufacturing industry, value added (current US$) as per cent 
of GDP
World Bank, national 
accounts data,  
and OECD, National 
Accounts data 
Time to entry Time required to start a business (days) = the number of calendar 
days needed to complete the procedures to legally operate a 
business
World Bank, Doing 
Business Project 
Entry procedures Number of procedures required to start a business, including 
interactions to obtain necessary permits and licenses and to 
complete all inscriptions, verifications and notifications to start 
operations
World Bank, Doing 
Business Project
Time to register 
property
Number of calendar days needed for businesses to secure rights 
to property




Number of procedures required for a business to secure rights 
to property
World Bank, Doing 
Business Project
Profit tax rate Amount of taxes on profits paid by the business (per cent of profit) World Bank, Doing 
Business Project 
Time required to 
file taxes 
Hours per year that it takes to prepare, file and pay (or withhold) 
three major types of taxes: corporate income tax, value added 
or sales tax, and labour taxes, including payroll taxes and social 
security contributions
World Bank, Doing 
Business Project
Unemployment Share of the labour force without work but available for and 




Scientific output Number of scientific and engineering articles published in the 
following fields: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical 
medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, 
and earth and space sciences, normalized by 1,000 domestic 
scientists (in logs).
World Bank, World 
Development Indicators
Source:  Based on ILOSTAT database; World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts; Transparency International; World 
Bank, Doing Business Project; International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics; World Bank World Development 
Indicators; World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report; UNSTAT Global SDG Indicators Database.
Note: number of observations = 1,433.
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3.5 Model
To test our hypotheses, we start by using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, 
which enables us to capture cross-country differences in factors that affect firm 
internationalization. We then apply fixed-effects panel estimation to combine country and 
time effects (see Cumming et al., 2014). Given the time series data for 2000–2018, fixed-
effects panel data estimation enables us to control unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries and time in one model. Following Wallace and Hussain (1969) and Baltagi 
(2008), we estimate the regression model as follows (1) with two-way error component 
disturbances (2) where  denotes the unobservable country effect,  denotes the 
unobservable time effect and  is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. Note 
that  is country-invariant and accounts for any time-specific effect not included in 
the regression. For example, it could account for government programme intervention 
year effects that disrupt international business and drive the quality of business.  is 
time-invariant and accounts for country-specific effects, such as culture and informal 
institutional frameworks. In vector form, our panel data estimation is written as follows:
  (1)
  (2)
where  is the export share of GDP (model 1) and OFDI (model 2) in a given country   at 
time .  and  are parameters to be estimated,  is a vector of independent explanatory 
variables lagged one year , and  is a vector of exogenous control variables lagged 
one year ;  presents the interaction of corruption in the home country  with 
the number of export regulations and credit market environment at the time  by 
country . These include the disclosure index, non-financial investment, domestic credit, 
time to export, customs procedures related to exports, and tariff rate. As mentioned 
earlier, the error term  consists of unobserved country and time-specific effects and the 
remainder disturbance, and   is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. 
Our preference for fixed effects rather than random effects was driven by the results 
of a Hausman test (Baltagi, 2008).3 Endogeneity in the model could appear as a 
3 The Hausman test rejects the null at a 1 per cent significance level, suggesting that fixed effects 
should be used. The fixed-effects estimator concentrates on differences over time, and characterizes 
a single firm; that is why it is also referred to as the “within” estimator. It also explains to what extent 
a given firm’s change in a variable of interest affects its own internationalization activity. Thus, the 
fixed-effects estimator does not account for possible differences that exist across firms at a given 
point in time and thus does not identify the factors capturing why, for instance, the productivity of firm 
i is different from that of firm j. This is not the case of the random-effects estimator, whose estimates 
are obtained by weighing the “within” effect with the “between” effect, which allows us to identify the 
factors that explain the differences between firms in the panel. Thus, the random-effects estimates 
should provide a more exhaustive scenario of the drivers of internationalization activity in our sample. 
However, the possibility of a simultaneity bias induced by unobservable factors often suggests that 
the fixed-effects estimates may be preferred. 
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result of the correlation between  with unobserved factors in the error term, time-
varying unobservables that affect . Using fixed-effects estimation allows us to 
control for factors that change with time but do not change for the same country 
over our study period. At the same time, we acknowledge that addressing the 
potentially endogenous nature of the relationship between corruption and export 
is important, as corruption is associated with country-specific characteristics 
(e.g., business culture). Therefore, using fixed-effects estimation will control these 
country-specific unobservables that affect the relationship between corruption and 
exports. Using lagged values for control and explanatory variables would enforce 
the relationship arising from corruption changes affecting changes in exports. 
As part of our robustness checks, we calculated model (1) using both fixed and 
random effects, as each method has different assumptions on two-way error terms. 
To address the multicollinearity concern, we used the variance inflation factor in 
both models, which were between 2 and 5 (Kutner et al., 2004). Thus, the fixed-
effects regressions are tested for multicollinearity by calculating the variance 
inflation factor. As a result, it was found that despite the high pairwise correlation 
between corruption and economic development, they are not multicollinear in the 
models and can explain the regression outcome variable. Hence, the models seem 
to suggest that the predictors in question are reliably associated with the outcome 
(high estimates, low standard errors) (see McElreath, 2020).
We note that the significance and size of the beta coefficients might not always reflect 
the size or nature of the relationship if there is possible nonlinearity between export 
regulations and credit conditions in different economic contexts and internationalization 
(see Audretsch et al., 2019). We thus calculate post-estimated predictive margins for 
each institutional dimension using the results of the fixed-effects regression in table 
3 with the dependent variables exports (column 4) and OFDI (column 8). First, we 
calculated the direct effects of home export regulation, credit markets and corruption 
on internationalization (exports in the left column, OFDI in the right column, figure 2). 
We calculated post-estimated predictive margins to capture the nonlinear effects of 
home-country export regulation and credit market on internationalization in different 
corruption contexts (figures 3 and 4).4 The predictive margins enable us to visualize 
how a change in each of the institutional dimensions contributes to a marginal change 
in exports and OFDI across a distribution of each institutional dimension and between 
more and less corrupt contexts. Building on Williams (2012), the beta coefficients in table 
3 provide averaged results of model estimation and are limited in capturing nonlinear 
effects. For example, a one-unit change in the institutional dimension may result in a 
4 The margins are a tool to explain a relationship when the direction of the relationship may be non-
linear, rendering the net effect statistically insignificant.
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disproportionate change in internationalization at different institutional settings, which 
the beta coefficient cannot capture. Figures 2–4 illustrate the margins of responses for 
specified values of covariates. It uses 95 per cent confidence intervals to measure the 
boundaries of the effect of various institutional contexts on internationalization.
4. Empirical results
We start by presenting our findings using the predictive margins shown in figures 
2–4. These were calculated based on the results of fixed-effects estimations 
(coefficients in base effects and interaction effects), with exports and OFDI as two 
dependent variables (table 3). Table 3 includes both basic models for fixed effects 
(columns 1–2, 5–6) and models with interaction terms (columns 3–4 and 7–8, table 3).
Table 3.  Fixed-effects (FE) estimation with interactions
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 Model  
Model 1: 
Dependent variable exports as % of GDP
Model 2: 
Dependent variable OFDI as % of GDP
Time to export (H1) 7.41*** 49.91*** 39.79*** 36.51*** -0.89 -8.38 -14.94 -14.19(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.58) (0.28) (0.23)
Customs procedures (H1) -0.89 -0.62 2.53* 1.16 0.34 0.67 -1.01 -2.29(0.63) (0.60) (0.35) (0.36) (0.60) (0.69) (0.58) (0.61)
Trade tariff (H1) -0.15** -0.44*** -0.63*** -0.90*** 0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.02(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.10) (0.20) (0.20)
Disclosure index (H2) 0.41* 0.26 0.39* -0.16 -0.32 -0.18 -0.27 0.55(0.08) (0.20) (0.07) (0.45) (0.21) (0.26) (0.27) (0.54)
Domestic credit to  
private sector (H2)
-0.03** -0.03** 0.09*** 0.03* 0.03* 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Non-financial  
investment (H2)
-0.53*** -0.13 -0.12 0.16 0.28** 0.51*** 0.51*** -1.13***
(0.00) (0.14) (0.14) (0.33) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Corruption (H3) 0.02 -0.01 -0.14 1.88*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.71*** 0.58(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27)
Economic development 8.79** 3.06 -8.49* -5.03 -10.03* -15.10***(0.04) (0.39) (0.06) (0.57) (0.08) (0.00)
Population  -34.08** -34.14** -32.52** 3.52 3.97 4.47 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.75) (0.83) (0.84)
Industry 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.25***(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time to entry  0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.20) (0.20)
Entry procedures -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
/…
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Time to register property 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
Procedures to register 
property
-0.54* -0.34 -0.72** 0.38 0.53 0.43
(0.07) (0.12) (0.03) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38)
Profit tax rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05(0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Time required to file taxes 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01(0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14)
Unemployment 0.22** 0.21** 0.22** 0.12 0.12 0.17(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Scientific output -2.65*** -2.80*** -2.83*** -0.77 -0.78 -0.79(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.47) (0.47) (0.27)
Government size -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.17 -0.18 -0.13(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Trade tariff × Corruption 
(H4) 
-0.01 -0.01** 0.01 -0.01
(0.15) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
Time to export × 
Corruption (H4)
0.14*** 0.11*** 0.09* 0.08*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
Customs procedures x 
Corrup-tion (H4)
0.07** 0.04 -0.04 -0.07**
(0.02) (0.13) (0.15) (0.01)
Domestic credit to private 











Constant 12.41 -65.76* -21.19 81.18* -2.53 39.71 63.36 99.64**(0.59) (0.02) (0.51) (0.05) (0.31) (0.78) (0.94) (0.01)
Number of observations 1443 1443 1443 1443 1443 1443 1443 1443
R2 within 0.075 0.277 0.291 0.309 0.049 0.062 0.066 0.088
R2 overall 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.038 0.015 0.007 0.007
R2 between 0.011 0.017 0.005 0.001 0.0525 0.004 0.025 0.001
F-stats 5.26 13.24 13.09 12.94 3.18 2.20 2.15 2.66
Log-likelihood -5 586.48 -4 579.00 -4 565.30 -4 546.87 -5 296.43 -4 563.79 -4 561.30 -4 544.83
F Test u=0 175.55 169.60 152.51 134.13 4.76 3.73 3.72 4.02
Sigma u 28.39 33.32 32.32 31.84 4.94 5.50 5.90 6.36
Sigma e 7.25 6.06 6.01 5.95 6.89 6.89 6.89 6.82
Rho 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.46
Source:  Based on ILOSTAT database; World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts; Transparency International; World 
Bank, Doing Business Project; International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics; World Bank World Development 
Indicators; World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report; UNSTAT, Global SDG Indicators Database.
Note: Reference year = 2000. Number of observations = 1,433. Number of countries = 96. P-values are in parentheses.
Table 3.  Fixed-effects (FE) estimation with interactions (Concluded)
 Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 Model 
Model 1: 
Dependent variable exports as % of GDP
Model 2: 
Dependent variable OFDI as % of GDP
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We used the “margin” command in the statistical software STATA 15 to compute the 
standard errors of the means. The “marginsplot” command was used afterward as 
it gives a good view of the shape of the relationship (Williams, 2012). It illustrates the 
strength and direction of the relationship as well as changes in the marginal effect 
between institutional dimensions and internationalization. For example, predictive 
margins allow us to ask a question like, what would be the share of exports in 
GDP as the time to export (border compliance) increases from 10 to 50 days, in a 
country with more or less corruption? It also allows us to make efficient comparisons 
between levels of corruption, as well as to measure the size of the effect of each 
change in institutional dimension (export regulation and credit markets). 
We find partial support for Hypothesis 1a (H1a), which predicted that more 
extensive home-country export regulations would discourage exports (figures 2A 
and 2C). Customs procedures and tariff rates hamper exports, but time to export 
(measured in hours) facilitates exports (column 4, table 3). The beta coefficient 
for customs procedures is not significant, and the relationship turns negative at 
the high level of customs procedures (figure 2C). Accounting for tariff and non-
tariff regulation jointly, we discover that changes in tariff regulation better predict 
changes in exports. Figure 2A illustrates the negative relationship – for example, an 
increase in tariff rate from 10 to 30 per cent results in a decrease in exports from 
35 to 25 per cent of GDP. 
H1b predicted that more extensive home-country export regulations would 
encourage OFDI (figures 2B, 2D, 2F and column 8, table 3). We do not find support 
for this (examining customs procedures, tariff rates and time to export).
Turning to our hypotheses on the direct effect of home-country credit markets, 
we find partial support for H2a, which predicted that less developed home 
credit markets would discourage exports (figures 2G, 2I, 2K). Investment in non-
financial assets has no effect on exporting (figure 2K and column 4 in table 3). 
Domestic credit to the private sector increases as it moves from zero to 80 and 
then decreases again (figure 2G), which means its effect on exports is nonlinear. 
We also find that coefficients in columns 3–4 (table 3) change. Higher disclosure 
facilitates exports (figure 2I). We do not find support for H2b, which predicted that 
less developed home credit markets would encourage OFDI (figures 2H, 2J, 2L). 
An increase in domestic credit to the private sector increases OFDI (figure 2H), and 
investment in non-financial assets also results in higher OFDI (figure 2L) (column 8, 
table 3). Disclosure rate is not associated with OFDI. 
H3a and H3b predicted that home-country corruption would discourage exports 
and encourage OFDI, respectively. We find that corruption is not associated with an 
increase in exports (figure 2M) but is negative and statistically significant for OFDI. 
When corruption approaches a value of 50, one can say that OFDI turns to zero 
(figure 2N). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3915152
51
Home-country export regulations, credit markets, and corruption:  






















0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Tariff rate applied,





Net outows of FDI 
(% of GDP)




Figure 2. Impact on internationalization of export regulation, credit market 





























Net outows of FDI 
(% of GDP)
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
Burden of customs
 procedure, reversed
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3915152












0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Domestic credit to private
 sector (% GDP)






0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Domestic credit to private
sector (% GDP)
Net outows of FDI 
(% of GDP)
Business extent of disclosure index:






0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 2. Impact on internationalization of export regulation, credit market 
 environment and corruption (Direct effects) (Continued)
Domestic credit to private
Disclosure









0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Business extent of disclosure index:









-5 5 15 25
Net investment in non-nancial
assets (% of GDP)






-5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Net investment in non-nancial
assets (% of GDP)
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3915152
53
Home-country export regulations, credit markets, and corruption:  
implications for different types of internationalization
For the purpose of testing the moderating effect of corruption, we used the median 
of the Corruption Perception Index for our countries, splitting the sample into more 
corrupt (above median) and less corrupt (below median) contexts. We then tested 
our hypotheses and predictive margins. 
H4 posited that home-country corruption would accentuate the negative effect of 
extensive export regulations on exports (H4a) and the positive effect of export regulations 
on OFDI (H4b). We find partial support for H4a when it comes to tariff regulation but 
not our other measures of export regulation. In a zero tariff context, average exports to 
GDP are 42 per cent for both less and more corrupt contexts. However, an increase 
in tariff rates in more corrupt contexts (>(-45) of inverted Corruption Perception Index) 
accentuates a negative effect of tariff regulation on exports, with the difference in 
the decline in export rates between less and more corrupt contexts becoming more 
pronounced after tariff rates >10 (figure 3A). When tariffs reach 35 per cent in more 
corrupt contexts, exports fall to 25 per cent of GDP. The same tariff rate (35 per cent) in 
less corrupt contexts (≤45 of the inverted Corruption Perception Index) reduces exports 
to GDP to 35 per cent (Figure 3A). Figures 3B, 3D and 3F illustrate the relationship 
between corruption and export regulation in their impact on OFDI. We do not find 
empirical evidence to support H4b: more corruption does not accentuate an effect 
of export regulation on OFDI. In countries with extensive export regulation, more 
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Figure 2. Impact on internationalization of export regulation, credit market 
 environment and corruption (Direct effects) (Concluded)
Corruption
Source: Based on ILOSTAT database; World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts; SIPRI yearbooks; Transparency 
 International; World Bank, Doing Business Project; International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics; World Bank World 
 Development Indicators; World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report; UNSTAT, Global SDG Indicators Database.
Note: Reference year = 2000. Number of observations = 1,433. Number of countries = 96. 
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H5 predicted that home-country corruption would accentuate a negative effect of 
weak credit market effects on exports (H5a) as well as a positive effect of weak 
credit market effects on OFDI (H5b). Our results do not provide support for either 
hypothesis. We find that more corruption reduces the positive effect of disclosure 
on exports, whereas high levels of disclosure in more corrupt contexts will have 
lower export rates (figure 4C). The results for other factors are not significant (figures 
4A, 4E). We find that more corruption does not accentuate a positive effect of weak 
credit market effects on OFDI (figures 4B, 4D, 4F) (see Stoian and Mohr, 2016). We 
find that an increase in non-financial investments in a country increases OFDI (figure 
4F). At the same time, in more corrupt contexts, weak credit market institutions 
reduce OFDI. We find that corruption reduces OFDI (columns (5–7, table 3).
Our findings in figures 3 and 4 line up with previous findings on the negative effect 
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When it comes to our control variables, we find that population size is not associated 
with OFDI, and that countries with large populations and larger markets have on 
average 32–34 per cent of GDP less in exports than smaller countries. We find that 
countries with higher GDP per capita have higher exports (columns 2–3, table 3) 
than those with lower GDP per capita, which has a lower share of OFDI. We also 
find a positive effect of the unemployment rate on exports and a neutral effect on 
OFDI, which could be associated with structural changes in the economy. Human 
capital is negatively associated with exporting and neutral for OFDI. Time to register 
property has a positive effect on exports. 
Table 4 summarizes the results of our hypotheses testing.
E F
Exports OFDI 
Figure 4. Credit market environment and internationalization in countries 
 with different levels of corruption (Indirect effects) (Concluded)
Investment in non-nancial assets
Source: Based on ILOSTAT database; World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts; SIPRI yearbooks; Transparency 
 International; World Bank, Doing Business Project; International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics; World Bank World 
 Development Indicators; World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report; UNSTAT, Global SDG Indicators Database.
Note: Reference year = 2000. Number of observations = 1,433. Number of countries = 96. 
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5. Robustness checks 
We did a series of robustness checks to observe the effect of export regulations 
and credit markets on exports and OFDI. We also estimated pooled OLS regression 
with year-fixed effects but no country-fixed effects and created predicted margins 
using OLS data. The signs and range of the coefficients were similar, but standard 
errors were different, demonstrating the OLS estimation’s potential bias.5 
We performed Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation on our model 
by adding the first and second lagged values of exports (model 1) and OFDI (model 
2) as an independent variable in a model. Neither the first nor second lag of the 
dependent variable was statistically significant. Furthermore, we examined the 
5 OLS results in table and predictive margins are not reported but are available from the authors on 
request. Owing to differences in the size of coefficients, we consider that the relationship between 
institutions and internationalization is dynamic and changes over time, with panel data better for 
capturing transition.
Table 4.  Summary of hypotheses results
Hypotheses Results 
H1a














Less developed home-country credit markets will encourage internationalization 
through OFDI.
Not supported
H3a  Home-country corruption will discourage internationalization through export. Not supported
H3b  Home-country corruption will encourage internationalization through OFDI. Not supported
H4a
Higher home-country corruption will accentuate the negative relationship between 




Higher home-country corruption will accentuate the positive relationship between 
export regulations and OFDI.
Not supported
H5a




Higher home-country corruption will accentuate the positive effect of weak credit 
markets on OFDI.
Not supported
Source:  Authors’ estimations.
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autocorrelation of the first and second lagged residuals, and neither the first nor the 
second lag was collinear. We thus included the mixed-effects panel data model, 
excluding the lagged dependent variable.
Third, as part of the robustness check, we used bribery incidence, measured as 
the share of firms experiencing one or more bribes requests over the last year 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; 2012). This is taken from World Bank data. The indicator 
varies from 0.1 per cent for the least corrupt business environment to 69.6 per 
cent for the most corrupt. The 50th percentile of the sample refers to, on average, 
14.3 times out of 100 when one or more bribes was requested. Signs and ranges 
of the coefficients and standard errors were similar, demonstrating the robustness 
of estimation using both bribes demanded and the Corruption Perception Index.6 
In addition, we experimented with the second lag, which provided similar results in 
terms of coefficient size, the direction of relationship and significance levels.
6. Conclusions and policy considerations
We tested how export regulations, credit markets and corruption affect two types 
of internationalization activity in a country – one which captures exports and the 
other OFDI. Our findings underscore the importance of unpacking the institutional 
context shaping internationalization recognized in earlier literature (e.g. Chetty 
and Hamilton, 1993; Luiz et al., 2017) and considering multi-dimensionality in the 
environment for firms (Audretsch et al., 2019). 
Our findings add to scholarly debates in the following ways. First, related to the 
influence of the institutional context on OFDI and exports (Gaur et al., 2014, Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2019), we show that the home country’s institutional context has a 
different impact on the two types of internationalization. We find that corruption 
does not have a significant impact on exports, but it significantly hinders OFDI. 
Second, our study demonstrates that the relationship between some types of 
institutional contexts (e.g., credit conditions) and internationalization is nonlinear, 
with tariffs having a more substantial impact on exports than non-tariff regulation. 
This is in line with recent studies that have argued for the importance of decomposing 
the complex relationship between institutions and firms and economic outcomes, 
including considering non-linearities (see Audretsch et al., 2021, 2019). Our finding 
on time to export is based on our sample of varied institutional contexts and is 
not in line with previous research in the OECD context (Li, 2019) and could be 
investigated in future research.
6 Results available from the authors upon request.
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Third, our results show that credit markets can help explain both exports and OFDI, 
with OFDI being more affected by weak credit markets. This could be because 
of the resources required to venture into a foreign market (Gaur et al., 2014) as 
firms incur the costs of searching, developing relationships and learning the new 
environment. If OFDI is undertaken as a strategic escape response by firms in 
unfavourable home environments (Shi et al. 2017; Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2017, 
2015; Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2017; Witt and Levin, 2007), our finding on 
the role of the home credit market suggests that a level of home-country institutional 
quality may be needed even for FDI undertaken as an escape response. Our study 
does not directly test firm owner/manager options and strategic decisions, and it is 
an interesting question for future research.
Our study has implications for policymakers interested in supporting economic 
growth and improving international competitiveness through firm expansion into 
foreign markets. Targeted policy instruments on internationalization can include, for 
example, dedicated programmes or agencies to support exports and FDI (e.g., export 
and investment promotion agencies), broader firm growth support that can improve 
opportunities and resources needed to engage in exports, and a wide range of home-
country measures that affect FDI flows (e.g.. home-country regulations on capital 
outflows, technical assistance, information, technology transfer, financial and fiscal 
incentives, market access regulations and investment insurance) (see UNCTAD, 2001). 
Our findings show that not all regulatory settings have a similar impact on exports and 
OFDI. Our results suggest that customs procedures and tariffs may be appropriate 
areas to evaluate when the goal is to support exporting. It is also worth considering 
where and how broader anti-corruption efforts might affect internationalization. 
We find that higher levels of corruption discourage OFDI; we also find that tariffs 
affect exports differently in different levels of corruption, with reduced exports 
becoming more pronounced after higher tariff rates in more corrupt contexts. 
Note that our measure of corruption is not specific only to exporting or OFDI but 
reflects corruption perceptions more broadly, suggesting the potential for gains from 
improving several mutually supporting institutions (IMF, 2019, p. 40), particularly as 
many countries have pursued anti-corruption measures.
Our results also suggest that strengthening credit markets may support both exports 
and OFDI. One specific cluster of costs that firms face in internationalization relates 
to the fixed and sunk costs when exploring and venturing into foreign markets 
(Desbordes and Wei, 2017). They often rely on credits or capital from external 
sources to finance their upfront costs. Policymakers could assess if their domestic 
firms could benefit from measures to reduce search and exploration costs to assess 
foreign markets and help firms find prospects and partnerships abroad. Given the 
potential of new “born global” firms and the importance of credit in assisting new 
firms to access foreign markets (see Aghion et al., 2007), there can be value in 
helping new firms access foreign markets and access financial resources.
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7. Future research
Future research should focus on understanding how specific regulatory changes and 
policies affect exporting aspirations and outcomes. When it comes to corruption, an 
interesting question for future research is to understand how corruption, specifically 
in exporting processes (e.g. when bringing goods across borders), matters in the 
context of a highly corrupt environment. Our measure examined broader corruption 
perceptions, so decomposing where corruption occurs and how this affects 
internationalization can provide useful insight. This could shed light on our findings 
on time to export, which are based on widely varied institutional contexts. 
An important question is also on how reforms in credit markets affect small, 
new and informal firms that have export potential, compared with State-owned, 
large and established companies (see O’Toole and Tarp, 2014), as all firms are not 
affected equally (see Aghion et al., 2007; Roper et al., 2017). Future research can 
also examine the extent to which firms abandon exporting due to a challenging 
institutional environment and to what extent firms pursue OFDI as a substitute. 
Finally, our study may provide a useful base for more differentiated comparative 
analysis to shed more light on the complex direct and indirect relationships and 
interplay between regulatory aspects, credit markets and corruption in developed- 
and developing-country home-country contexts. 
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